# What Courts Have Actually Held About Short-Term Rentals > A restriction to residential purposes, standing alone, usually does not prohibit short-term rentals under the published American appellate decisions that have addressed the issue, because the majority line defines residential use by what occupants do in the dwelling and refuses to infer a minimum stay the covenant does not state. A smaller line treats systematic transient lodging as commercial when the declaration adds private-occupancy, business, hotel, or neighborhood-design language. Express minimum-lease terms, association amendment statutes, and municipal zoning are separate legal questions and cannot be collapsed into one rule. - Published: 2026-08-23 - Last reviewed: 2026-08-23 - Author: Dustin Hofer, Founder, Book With Haven - Canonical: https://www.bookwithhaven.com/research/what-courts-have-actually-held-about-short-term-rentals - Cite as: Dustin Hofer. (2026). What Courts Have Actually Held About Short-Term Rentals. Haven Research. https://www.bookwithhaven.com/research/what-courts-have-actually-held-about-short-term-rentals ## Key findings - As of August 23, 2026, generic “residential purposes only” language is a weak instrument for prohibiting short-term rentals in the published appellate corpus; courts repeatedly say a drafter who intended a minimum occupancy period could have stated one. - An express minimum lease term usually ends the interpretive dispute. Litigation then shifts to amendment authority, retroactivity, statutory grandfathering, voting procedure, or reasonableness. - Private covenants, zoning ordinances, and municipal licensing cannot be combined into one rule. The same occupancy can be residential under a deed and transient under a zoning definition. - Amendment power is state-specific as of 2026. Tennessee may bind an existing owner to a properly authorized thirty-day amendment; North Carolina applies a reasonableness doctrine; Florida Stat. § 718.110(13) and Idaho Code § 55-3211 add consent or grandfathering limits. - The 2024–2026 decisions move toward reading the whole declaration and the regulatory mechanism, not toward a universal definition of short-term rental. ## Report ## Executive summary and assumptions The American appellate authority is split, but not evenly. On the central private-covenant question, the stronger and more numerous line of cases holds that a restriction to “residential purposes,” without more, does **not** prohibit short-term rentals. Those courts ask what the occupants actually do in the house. Sleeping, eating, bathing, relaxing, and living in a dwelling remain residential activities even when the occupants stay for a weekend rather than a year. Texas, Tennessee, South Dakota, Mississippi, Washington, Maryland, New Mexico, Alabama, Colorado, Virginia, North Carolina, Indiana, Oregon, Florida, Arkansas, Wisconsin, Idaho, and several other jurisdictions have adopted some version of that approach. The Tennessee Supreme Court described it in 2023 as the view adopted by “nearly all” courts considering comparable residential-purpose covenants. A smaller but important line takes a different premise. Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, and, under more detailed covenants, Maine and Montana have treated systematic transient lodging as materially different from ordinary residential occupancy. These decisions tend to focus on one or more additional textual signals: “private occupancy,” “private dwelling,” a prohibition on “trade” or “business,” provisions distinguishing residential lots from hotels or commercial areas, a one-family occupancy requirement, or a declaration whose overall design unmistakably separates residential living from commercial lodging. _Hensley v. Gadd_, _Eager v. Peasley_, _Edwards v. Landry Chalet Rentals_, _Morgan v. Townsend_, _Myers v. Kleinhans_, and _Brandt v. R&R Mountain Escapes_ illustrate that line. The disagreement is therefore not well described as “some states allow Airbnb and some states prohibit it.” The deeper split concerns **what “use” means**. One camp looks principally at the renter's physical use of the premises. The other is more willing to count the owner's recurring rental enterprise, the transient character of the occupancy, and the declaration's neighborhood-wide design. That interpretive premise explains considerably more of the cases than the platform used, the amount of rent collected, or any arbitrary distinction between a seven-day and thirty-day stay. Three propositions emerge with unusual clarity. First, **“residential purposes only” is a weak instrument for prohibiting short-term rentals**. Courts repeatedly say that a drafter who intended a minimum occupancy period could have stated one. Texas's Supreme Court has twice refused to infer such a term, most recently in _JBrice Holdings, LLC v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n_. Tennessee reached the same conclusion in _Pandharipande v. FSD Corp._, expressly disapproving the reasoning of an older intermediate appellate case that treated transience as inherently nonresidential. Second, **an explicit minimum lease term is different**. “No lease for less than 30 days,” assuming the restriction was validly adopted and applies to the owner in question, normally ends the interpretive dispute. The litigation then shifts to amendment authority, retroactivity, statutory grandfathering, voting procedure, or reasonableness. Tennessee's _Pandharipande_, California's _Orchard Estate Homes_, North Carolina's _McDougald_ and _Mileview_, Georgia's _Vaughn_, and Idaho's 2026 _North Henry's Lake_ decision show how different state rules can produce different answers to that second question. Third, **private covenants, zoning ordinances, and municipal licensing laws cannot be combined into one rule**. Pennsylvania demonstrates why. In _Ruffed Grouse Ridge Owners' Ass'n v. Hura_, the Commonwealth Court held that a private “private residential purposes” covenant did not itself prohibit the owner's ordinary short-term rentals. Yet the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's _Slice of Life_ zoning decision treats purely transient lodging as outside a zoning category defined around a “single housekeeping unit.” _Hura_ specifically said _Slice of Life_ was inapposite because the latter interpreted a zoning ordinance containing different terms. Because there was no specified jurisdiction or live dispute, this report is a national doctrinal survey reviewed as of August 23, 2026, rather than advice concerning a particular property. The principal missing information is therefore the actual governing declaration, deed, association type, and state of any reader who might apply these findings. Those details can change the result completely. This is a research survey, not legal advice. An owner facing an actual restriction or enforcement proceeding should have the recorded documents, amendments, applicable statutes, and local ordinances reviewed by counsel in that jurisdiction. ## Methodology and current state by jurisdiction The research concentrated on reported state supreme court and intermediate appellate opinions, supplemented by significant federal appellate decisions for ordinance challenges. Searches combined terms such as _short-term rental_, _vacation rental_, _Airbnb_, _residential purposes_, _commercial use_, _private dwelling_, _restrictive covenant_, _deed restriction_, _HOA amendment_, _minimum lease_, _transient occupancy_, and _nonconforming use_. Citation chaining from high-court opinions proved particularly useful because recent decisions such as _Pandharipande_, _Morgan_, _Wilson_, and _Brandt_ themselves collect the competing authorities. The retained corpus below contains more than fifty appellate authorities, including older foundational cases where recent courts continue to rely on them. Trial-level decisions were excluded except where needed to explain appellate history. Law-firm summaries and association commentary were not treated as authority. Recent statutes were checked against official legislative sources where accessible, particularly in Florida, Arizona, California, Idaho, Texas, and Wisconsin, and against the controlling appellate opinion where the opinion itself reproduced the statute, as in Idaho. The table concerns the **private residential-use question**, not whether short-term rentals are legal under local zoning.
State Leading or controlling private-covenant authority Present rule on generic residential-use language Important qualification
Alabama Slaby v. Mountain River Estates Residential Ass'n, 100 So. 3d 569 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) STR ordinarily remains residential use “Single family residential purposes only” plus commercial-use ban did not create a duration restriction; later courts repeatedly cite Slaby as a leading occupant-use case.
Arkansas Vera Lee Angel Revocable Trust v. O'Bryant, 2018 Ark. 38, 537 S.W.3d 254 Allows under language before court Rental did not change the essential residential character; listed commercial examples such as hotels and tourist courts mattered.
Colorado Houston v. Wilson Mesa Ranch HOA, 360 P.3d 255 (Colo. App. 2015) Allows Temporary occupancy remains residential; an HOA board could not manufacture an unstated minimum term through a rule.
Florida Santa Monica Beach Property Owners Ass'n v. Acord, 219 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) Allows under generic residential/business language The covenant prohibited business use but contained no rental-duration restriction.
Idaho Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003); Delano v. Pike (Idaho Ct. App. 2025) Allows Delano reaffirmed that short and long residential rentals do not become prohibited commercial enterprises merely because rent is paid.
Indiana Applegate v. Colucci, 908 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) Allows Especially strong where the declaration expressly allows leasing “for residential use” without a duration limit.
Kentucky Hensley v. Gadd, 560 S.W.3d 516 (Ky. 2018) Prohibits under the integrated covenant before the court Residential lots were distinguished from a lot where hotels and other commercial uses were expressly permitted; STRs were treated as hotel-like transient use.
Louisiana Edwards v. Landry Chalet Rentals, LLC, 246 So. 3d 754 (La. Ct. App. 2018) Prohibits Transient occupants were held not to use the premises residentially, and systematic rentals were treated as commercial activity.
Maine Morgan v. Townsend, 2023 ME 62 Residential phrase alone does not categorically ban paying guests; frequent dedicated STR operation violated a separate business clause Maine rejected an absolute transience rule but found the owner's 59 rentals in 28 months, exclusive STR use, and business pattern sufficient under “no trade or business shall be conducted therefrom.”
Maryland Lowden v. Bosley, 395 Md. 58, 909 A.2d 261 (2006) Allows “Residential” does not inherently contain a minimum-duration component.
Michigan Eager v. Peasley, 322 Mich. App. 174, 911 N.W.2d 470 (2017); Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Owners Ass'n (Mich. Ct. App. 2023) Prohibits under Michigan's private-occupancy/commercial-use cases Published authority treats short-term rental as commercial use even when occupants engage in residential activities.
Mississippi Lake Serene Property Owners Ass'n v. Esplin, 334 So. 3d 1139 (Miss. 2022) Allows State supreme court focused on use as a place of abode, not duration; a bylaw-level attempt to impose a 180-day rule could not override the recorded covenants.
Missouri Mullin v. Silvercreek Condominium Owners Ass'n, 195 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) Allows under declaration examined Frequently cited foundational vacation-rental authority; the document contained no adequate prohibition.
Montana Brandt v. R&R Mountain Escapes, LLC, 2025 MT 155; Myers v. Kleinhans, 2024 MT 208; compare Craig Tracts HOA v. Brown Drake, LLC, 2020 MT 305, 477 P.3d 283 Text dependent, with recent authority more restrictive Craig Tracts found generic “residential” language ambiguous; Myers and Brandt enforce stronger commercial-purpose language and whole-document residential design against STRs.
North Carolina Russell v. Donaldson, 222 N.C. App. 702, 731 S.E.2d 535 (2012) Allows A business/commercial ban does not itself bar residential vacation rentals; later amendment cases apply a separate reasonableness doctrine.
New Mexico Mason Family Trust v. DeVaney, 2009-NMCA-048, 207 P.3d 1176; Estates at Desert Ridge Trails HOA v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) Allows Court declines to attach permanency or a required length of stay to residential use.
Ohio Kinzel v. Ebner, 157 N.E.3d 898 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) Allows under deed language at issue Structural language about a private or single dwelling did not establish the asserted rental-duration restriction; zoning restrictions were analyzed separately.
Oklahoma Graham v. Reynolds (Okla. Civ. App. 2024) Allows “Residential” and “commercial” language was insufficiently definite to bar STRs and was construed in favor of free use.
Oregon Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or. 358, 937 P.2d 1019 (1997) Allows where covenant is ambiguous A foundational strict-construction case repeatedly cited by later STR courts.
Pennsylvania Ruffed Grouse Ridge Owners' Ass'n v. Hura (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024); compare Liotta v. Hawkins (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024) Unsettled; text and tribunal matter Hura permits ordinary STR use under “private residential” and commercial-use provisions; Liotta reached the opposite result under different language. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not supplied a general private-covenant STR rule.
South Dakota Wilson v. Maynard, 2021 S.D. 37, 961 N.W.2d 596 Allows Supreme court adopted the occupant-use approach despite a dissent favoring the owners' profit-making perspective.
Tennessee Pandharipande v. FSD Corp. (Tenn. 2023) Generic “residential and no other purposes” language does not prohibit A thirty-day amendment was nevertheless enforceable because the declaration authorized additional restrictions and the amendment was not arbitrary and capricious.
Texas Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, 556 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. 2018); JBrice Holdings, LLC v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n (Tex. 2022) Allows No unstated minimum tenancy term may be inserted into “residential” or generic commercial-use provisions; tax treatment as an STR does not turn the use into a hotel.
Virginia Scott v. Walker, 274 Va. 209, 645 S.E.2d 278 (2007) Allows because generic language is ambiguous Ambiguity concerning transience is resolved against the restriction.
Washington Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Communities Ass'n, 180 Wn.2d 241, 327 P.3d 614 (2014) Allows Vacation occupancy is residential regardless of duration where tenants undertake ordinary residential activities; a later majority amendment could not create an unrelated new restriction.
Wisconsin Forshee v. Neuschwander, 2018 WI 62, 914 N.W.2d 643 Allows under “no commercial activity” clause Justices differed over why, and the dissent viewed substantial rental receipts as commercial; the judgment nevertheless rejected enforcement of the ban.
Coverage is genuinely uneven. There is substantial private-covenant appellate authority in some states, while in others the important cases concern zoning, association amendment power, or municipal regulation rather than the meaning of “residential use.” The absence of a state from this table should therefore not be read as permission to operate an STR. ## The doctrinal split and the language that drives outcomes The cleanest way to understand the cases is to stop asking, initially, whether a short-term rental is “commercial.” Courts first have to decide **whose use they are describing**. In the occupant-use line, the homeowner's act of making a rental agreement and receiving money is conceptually separated from the guest's use of the land. Texas put this especially clearly in _JBrice_: the leasing business does not occupy the premises, the tenants do. When the tenants possess the home, their use consists of residential occupancy, and the covenant contained no minimum term. The court also refused to convert a short lease into a hotel “license” simply because the property was advertised publicly or subject to hotel-occupancy tax. _Tarr_ supplied the underlying rule. A residential covenant that says nothing about leasing, vacation homes, owner occupancy, domicile, or minimum periods cannot be rewritten to contain those requirements. Tennessee's Supreme Court independently reached essentially the same result in _Pandharipande_: dictionary definitions could support both a permanence-based and a broader dwelling-based meaning of “residential,” which was enough to make the restrictive interpretation uncertain. Tennessee's rule that property restrictions must be clear then resolved the uncertainty for the owner. _Lake Serene_ states the point in particularly practical terms. The salient issue is whether the property is used as a place of abode, not how long it is so used. Florida's _Acord_ likewise concentrated on “ordinary living purposes” rather than rental duration. New Mexico's _Vazquez_, Maryland's _Lowden_, South Dakota's _Wilson_, Washington's _Wilkinson_, Alabama's _Slaby_, and Colorado's _Houston_ form the same doctrinal family. The opposing line starts from a different conception of residence. In _Hensley_, the Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned that the declaration itself drew a line between single-family residential lots and another lot on which commercial uses including hotels were allowed. Short, repeatedly advertised transient occupancy looked to the court like the hotel side of that line. The fact that hotel guests also eat and sleep did not, in the court's view, make a hotel a single-family residential use. Importantly, _Hensley_ did not announce that every paid tenancy is commercial. It expressly recognized permissible residential rentals and declined to determine exactly how long such a tenancy must last. Michigan takes an unusually strong version of the commercial-use approach. In _Eager_, followed by the published 2023 _Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Owners Ass'n_ opinion, the Court of Appeals treated short-term rental itself as commercial use despite the residential nature of the guests' activities. _Aldrich_ reasoned from Michigan precedent defining “commercial” in profit-oriented terms and from a declaration that separately designated areas for residential and commercial development. Maine is more nuanced. _Morgan v. Townsend_ rejected the proposition that “private residential purposes,” standing alone, categorically excludes paying overnight guests. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court expressly recognized the slight majority rule favoring STR owners. But Townsend's property was rented 59 times in 28 months, essentially dedicated to short-term guests, advertised and managed as such, and taxed as lodging. On those facts the court held that he was operating a business “from” the property in violation of a separate covenant stating that “no trade or business shall be conducted therefrom.” The dissent objected that this created an undefined continuum between an occasional permissible rental and a forbidden STR business. The majority effectively acknowledged the line would remain fact sensitive. That distinction matters. _Morgan_ is not a holding that all Airbnb stays are nonresidential. It is a holding that a sufficiently sustained STR operation can violate a separately worded trade-or-business provision even though paying guests are not necessarily forbidden by “private residential purposes.” Montana has evolved in a similarly text-sensitive way. _Craig Tracts_ found “residential purposes only” ambiguous and allowed STR use after considering the covenant's wording and circumstances. _Myers_ later treated the operation of an STR as a prohibited “commercial business” under stronger text. In 2025, _Brandt_ emphasized the declaration as a whole: its stated purpose of “country residential living,” together with a broad prohibition on “business, trade, manufacture, or any other commercial purpose,” made the STR operation impermissible. That does not formally erase _Craig Tracts_. It shows that Montana's answer depends on the integrated declaration rather than a categorical rule about rentals. The practical hierarchy of covenant language across the cases looks approximately like this:
Covenant language Typical appellate treatment Why
“Residential purposes only” Usually insufficient by itself “Residential” describes the nature of occupancy but normally supplies no express temporal element.
“Single-family residence” describing the permitted building Usually insufficient by itself Courts often read this structurally: one kind of dwelling may be built, rather than only permanent families may occupy it. Kinzel and many earlier authorities illustrate the distinction.
“Private residential purposes” Stronger, but not decisive Maine and Texas reject an automatic equation between “private” and “long term”; context matters.
“No business or commercial use” Split Texas, Wisconsin, Alabama, New Mexico, North Carolina and others distinguish rent collection from on-premises commercial use. Michigan and, on intensive facts, Maine treat STR operations as commercial.
Residential lots expressly contrasted with “hotel,” “motel,” or a separately designated commercial district Strong evidence against STRs Kentucky's Hensley is the clearest example because the declaration itself supplied the comparison.
“Private dwelling house for use and occupancy by one family” Fact sensitive and stronger than structural “single-family residence” Maine considered this genuinely directed at occupancy, although it refused an impossibly literal definition that would exclude ordinary guests.
“No rentals for fewer than 30 days,” “90 days,” etc. Usually dispositive on meaning The fight becomes whether the clause was validly adopted and can be enforced against that owner.
The cases also expose a recurring false signal: **tax classification**. Governments often define stays under thirty days as taxable lodging. That can be relevant evidence, as Maine found in _Morgan_, but it is not automatically incorporated into a century-old deed. Texas's Supreme Court squarely rejected the idea that hotel-occupancy taxation changes an otherwise residential lease into a prohibited hotel use. On-site conduct can change the analysis more legitimately. A house where guests simply possess the dwelling is easier to characterize as residential than a property functioning as an event venue, staffed inn, public meeting site, commercial retreat, or business with regular on-site services. _Tarr_ distinguished earlier Texas authority involving such uses, and Pennsylvania's _Hura_ upheld ordinary residential renting while recognizing that advertising the property for corporate retreats could implicate its commercial-use language. The doctrinal split can be reduced to this decision structure: 1. Read the recorded covenant. 2. If it states an express rental-duration limit, interpretation is usually straightforward. The remaining question is whether that restriction was validly adopted and binds this owner. 3. If there is no duration limit and only generic residential language, the majority rule is that short-term rental usually remains residential. 4. If the instrument adds private-occupancy, one-family, business, hotel, or whole-document language, the analysis is context-specific. 5. Courts that focus on the occupant's activity are more likely to treat the use as residential. Courts that count the owner's enterprise and the transient character of the stay find a greater risk of violation. The notable trend is not toward a universal definition of STR. It is toward **textual specificity**. Courts on both sides increasingly insist on reading the whole declaration rather than treating the words “Airbnb,” “commercial,” or “residential” as talismans. Tennessee's 2023 decision is particularly important because it rejected its own older intermediate court's transience theory while simultaneously enforcing an express thirty-day amendment. The message for drafters could hardly be clearer: use a duration if duration is what matters. ## Amendments, retroactivity, and association enforcement Whether an existing covenant prohibits an STR and whether an association **may amend** the covenant to prohibit STRs are separate questions. Several important cases reach opposite answers to those two propositions in the same dispute. _Pandharipande_ is the best example. The Tennessee Supreme Court first held that the original clause, “each Lot shall be used for residential and no other purposes,” did not clearly forbid two-to-twenty-eight-day rentals. It then enforced a 2018 amendment establishing a thirty-day minimum. Tennessee law permits purchasers to buy into a declaration containing amendment powers, and an amendment authorized by that bargain is generally reviewed under an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, not a judicially invented prohibition on making restrictions stricter. The declaration expressly contemplated “additional restrictions and obligations,” which made the owner's retroactivity objection especially weak. North Carolina is materially different. _Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n_, 360 N.C. 547, 633 S.E.2d 78 (2006), holds that an amendment must be reasonable in light of the original contractual bargain. In the unpublished 2024 _McDougald_ decision, the original documents devoted the subdivision to residential use and prohibited commercial ventures but said nothing about rental duration. A later amendment imposed ninety-day minimum rentals for non-owner-occupied lots. Applying _Armstrong_, the Court of Appeals held the new restriction unreasonable as to the plaintiffs. It expressly relied on _Russell_, under which commercial-use language does not itself prohibit short-term residential vacation rentals. _Mileview LLC v. Reserve II at Sugar Mountain Condominium Owners Ass'n_, also unpublished in 2024, belongs to the same amendment line and therefore should not be cited as controlling North Carolina precedent. Its importance is illustrative rather than precedential: associations cannot assume that obtaining the numerical vote specified in a declaration necessarily resolves the substantive scope of amendment authority. Washington's _Wilkinson_ likewise rejected the use of a general amendment mechanism to create what the state supreme court considered a new restriction not contemplated by the original covenants' general plan. That holding is independent of the court's conclusion that vacation stays themselves were residential. At the opposite end, Georgia's Court of Appeals in _Vaughn v. Windfield Homeowners Ass'n_ upheld a 2025 challenge to amendments prohibiting STRs. The owners attacked the association's formation, statutory status, consent theory, and amendment process. The court concluded the amendments had been properly enacted and bound the challengers. Georgia therefore illustrates why national statements such as “an HOA cannot take away an existing rental right” are unsound. Whether it can do so depends on the declaration and state common-interest law. California adds a statutory layer. _Orchard Estate Homes v. Orchard Homeowner Alliance_ arose after an association's board-level rule against rentals under thirty days had been held unenforceable because the restriction was not in the CC&Rs. The association sought an owner amendment and then judicial relief under [Civil Code § 4275](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=4275.&lawCode=CIV) to lower the voting threshold. The published Court of Appeal opinion affirmed the trial court's approval after applying the statutory criteria, including majority support and reasonableness. Current [California Civil Code § 4741](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=4741.&lawCode=CIV) now expressly permits a common-interest development to prohibit transient or short-term rentals for periods of thirty days or less, while restricting broader association prohibitions on rentals. That statute took effect against governing documents from January 1, 2021. Thus California's statutory policy distinguishes STR prohibitions from sweeping bans on leasing. Florida supplies the clearest example of legislation altering the retroactivity landscape. In _Woodside Village Condominium Ass'n v. Jahren_, 806 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 2002), the Florida Supreme Court had broadly upheld a condominium declaration amendment restricting rentals. Florida's current Condominium Act, [§ 718.110(13)](https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2025/0718.110), now provides that an amendment prohibiting rentals, changing rental duration, or restricting rental frequency applies only to owners who consent and owners who acquire their units after the amendment's effective date. The statutory history identifies the 2004 legislation that introduced the protection. Idaho has gone further. [Idaho Code § 55-3211](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title55/t55ch32/sect55-3211/) states that an HOA may not add, amend, or enforce a covenant limiting rental “for any amount of time” unless the affected property's owner expressly agreed in writing at the time of the addition or amendment. In _North Henry's Lake Homeowners Ass'n v. Norton_, decided January 6, 2026, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the protection attaches to the property in the relevant sense: because the owner at the time of the 2016 amendment refused to consent, and no later owner affirmatively consented, the recorded STR amendment did not become enforceable against successors merely because they purchased with record notice. This is a genuine legislative override of the ordinary majority-amendment model. Idaho's earlier _Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner's Ass'n_ had upheld a six-month minimum-rental amendment under the law then applicable. Section 55-3211, effective March 24, 2016, now makes owner-specific written consent critical for newly added rental restrictions. The 2026 supreme court opinion identifies the 2016 session law and the current statutory text. That HOA-consent rule is a different instrument from Idaho's 2026 municipal [preemption statute](/blog/state-preemption-of-short-term-rental-rules-what-the-july-1-laws-in-idaho-and-indiana-actually-change), which limits what cities and counties may do and leaves private covenants in place. Arizona similarly directs planned-community analysis back to the recorded declaration. [A.R.S. § 33-1806.01](https://www.azleg.gov/ars/33/01806-01.htm) provides that an owner may use property as a rental unless the declaration prohibits it and must comply with rental-time restrictions that the declaration does contain. The statute also sharply limits what rental information an association can demand. Association enforcement creates another layer that is easy to miss. Even an unquestionably valid STR restriction does not automatically validate any enforcement method the board chooses. Depending on the state and declaration, the association may need proper notice, an opportunity for a hearing, statutory authority to levy a fine, compliance with daily-fine caps, consistent enforcement, and satisfaction of prerequisites for attorney-fee recovery. Waiver and selective-enforcement defenses are highly fact dependent. _Hensley_, for example, separately considered and rejected a waiver theory after deciding that the underlying rentals violated the Kentucky declaration. Texas's _JBrice_ illustrates a more fundamental limit: rulemaking authority cannot contradict the declaration. The Wilcrest Walk documents affirmatively provided that, except for restrictions already contained in the governing instruments, “there shall be no restriction” on an owner's right to lease. [Texas Property Code § 204.010(a)(6)](https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/PR/htm/PR.204.htm) therefore did not independently authorize the board to prohibit rentals under thirty days. “No restriction,” the court observed, meant no restriction. A 2026 Texas intermediate decision, _Northampton Maintenance Fund, Inc. v. JAS Luxury Rentals, LLC_, underscores how document-specific that conclusion is. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals distinguished _Tarr_ when confronting whether a different association possessed authority to adopt a lease-duration policy. It expressly noted that _Tarr_ interpreted the deed restrictions before that court rather than establishing that every Texas association lacks rulemaking power over rental duration. The enforcement lesson is therefore sequential. First ask whether the covenant prohibits the use. Second ask whether a later amendment validly does so. Third ask whether that amendment applies to this owner. Only then ask whether the board used a legally authorized enforcement mechanism. ## Ordinances and zoning: separate legal regimes Municipal STR regulation rests on police power and statutory zoning authority, not on the law of servitudes. The interpretive presumptions, governmental objectives, constitutional constraints, and remedies differ. A court can therefore regard the **same physical occupancy** as residential under a private deed and as impermissible transient lodging under a zoning ordinance without contradicting itself. That is a different docket from the municipal cap and licensing fights we have covered in Insights, including the [Folly Beach license-cap ruling](/blog/folly-beach-short-term-rental-ruling). Pennsylvania makes the distinction unusually visible. In _Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Township Zoning Hearing Board_, 207 A.3d 886 (Pa. 2019), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted a residential zoning ordinance whose definition of “family” required a “single housekeeping unit.” It concluded that a purely transient use did not fit that category. Later, in _Ruffed Grouse Ridge v. Hura_, the Commonwealth Court refused to import _Slice of Life_ into a private covenant dispute involving different language. Other zoning courts have gone both ways because ordinance wording varies. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in _Styller v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynnfield_, 487 Mass. 588, 169 N.E.3d 160 (2021), treated an STR as inconsistent with the zoning provisions before it. New Hampshire moved the opposite direction in _Town of Conway v. Kudrick_ (2023), holding that the local ordinance's definition of a residential/dwelling unit permitted non-owner-occupied STRs. The New Hampshire decision generated a dissent, again demonstrating that even zoning outcomes turn on definitions rather than an inherent legal nature of STRs. Connecticut's Supreme Court addressed the problem in _Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals_ in 2024. The litigation turned on the particular zoning vocabulary governing family, dwelling, roomers, boarders, and lodgers, reinforcing the central methodological point: zoning definitions must be read on their own terms. Ohio's _Kinzel_ is useful because covenant and ordinance issues appeared in the same litigation. The court agreed that the deed restrictions had not clearly prohibited STRs, yet separately analyzed Sandusky zoning provisions defining a “dwelling” in terms of non-transient residential use and defining transient occupancy by reference to a thirty-day period. That is precisely the analytical separation a sound national survey requires. Constitutional challenges to municipal regulation have generally been difficult, although governments do not always win. In _Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica_, 940 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit rejected a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to Santa Monica's ordinance banning rentals of thirty days or less unless a primary resident remained in the dwelling. The court held the complaint did not plausibly establish discrimination against or an undue burden on interstate commerce. _Nekrilov v. City of Jersey City_, 45 F.4th 662 (3d Cir. 2022), likewise rejected constitutional claims after Jersey City tightened a regime that had previously encouraged STR investment. Owners and leaseholders alleged takings, Contract Clause, substantive due process, and procedural due process violations based in part on investments made in reliance on the earlier ordinance. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. The case is significant precisely because substantial reliance expenditures did not transform the earlier regulatory environment into a constitutional guarantee that the rules would never change. New Orleans produced an important exception. In _Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans_, 46 F.4th 317 (5th Cir. 2022), the Fifth Circuit held that a residency requirement discriminated on its face against out-of-state property owners and violated the dormant Commerce Clause when nondiscriminatory alternatives were available. New Orleans changed its regime, which produced further litigation and another Fifth Circuit decision in 2025. Recent cases continue to emphasize state statutory constraints on municipal power. Wisconsin's July 14, 2026 _Clinton v. Village of Sister Bay_ reversed a judgment involving a village's four-bedroom limitation on STRs and remanded for application of Wisconsin's statutory “Right to Rent” law, [Wis. Stat. § 66.1014](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/66/x/1014). The case illustrates a growing modern pattern: municipal zoning power may be constrained not primarily by the federal Constitution, but by state legislation enacted specifically for vacation rentals. The private-covenant and municipal fields also move independently. A state legislature can restrict cities while preserving every private HOA covenant, or restrict HOA amendments while leaving municipal zoning untouched. Readers should therefore resist statements that a statute “legalizes short-term rentals” unless the statute actually addresses all relevant layers. Ordinarily there are at least three: 1. the deed or common-interest declaration; 2. association rules and amendments authorized by that declaration and state HOA law; and 3. municipal zoning, licensing, occupancy, safety, and tax requirements. Passing one layer does not imply compliance with the others. The appellate cases above repeatedly demonstrate that separation. The 2026 [state-by-state legislative map](/blog/short-term-rental-laws-by-state-2026) covers the third layer and the statutes that reallocate it; it does not decide what a recorded covenant already says. The cash and administrative price of the municipal layer is a different measurement, covered in [The Cost of Compliance in U.S. Short-Term Rental Regulation](/research/the-cost-of-compliance-in-us-short-term-rental-regulation). ## Legislative overlay, direction of travel, risks, and research plan The most consequential legislation has generally not attempted to define “residential use” for every old deed. Instead, legislatures have allocated **who gets to regulate rentals and how**. Florida protects existing condominium owners against newly imposed rental restrictions unless they consent, while allowing the restriction to operate against later purchasers. California limits broad rental restrictions in common-interest developments but expressly preserves prohibitions on transient rentals of thirty days or less. Idaho requires express written consent from the affected owner before a new HOA rental restriction can burden the property. Arizona presumptively permits rental unless the recorded declaration prohibits it or contains applicable duration limits. These are four quite different legislative architectures. That diversity explains why an appellate decision cannot be checked for subsequent history only through later cases. A once-correct holding about amendment power may be displaced prospectively by legislation even if the opinion remains formally unreversed. Idaho and Florida are especially important examples. Chronologically, the private-covenant decisions do show movement, but not toward a single substantive classification. The older foundational authorities, including Oregon's _Yogman_ in 1997, Idaho's _Pinehaven_ in 2003, Maryland's _Lowden_ in 2006, Missouri's _Mullin_ in 2006, Virginia's _Scott_ in 2007, New Mexico's _Mason_ in 2009, and Indiana's _Applegate_ in 2009, established the modern permissive line before Airbnb litigation became commonplace. Their common theme was that generic residential language or a commercial prohibition should not be expanded to create an unstated leasing restriction. From roughly 2014 through 2023, high courts strengthened that reasoning. _Wilkinson_, _Tarr_, _Forshee_, _Wilson_, _Lake Serene_, and _Pandharipande_ all refused, in varying doctrinal formulations, to infer a categorical STR prohibition from generic restrictions. Kentucky's _Hensley_, Louisiana's _Edwards_, Michigan's _Eager_, and Maine's _Morgan_ form the counterweight. The 2024 to 2026 decisions suggest a more interesting development than a simple swing toward either camp. Courts are becoming increasingly attentive to the **entire instrument and regulatory mechanism**. Montana's _Brandt_ enforced a commercial-purpose prohibition in light of the declaration's overall residential design. Tennessee's _Pandharipande_ allowed STRs under the original language but enforced an explicit later thirty-day restriction. Idaho's _North Henry's Lake_ did not decide whether a thirty-day ban was sensible; it held that the legislature made written owner consent indispensable. Texas's _JBrice_ prohibited the association from using statutory rulemaking power to evade an express covenant protecting leasing. Georgia's _Vaughn_ upheld an amendment under a different statutory and documentary framework. Accordingly, the direction of travel is best described as **away from labels and toward document architecture**. A court is increasingly likely to ask: What exactly was restricted? Who has amendment power? Was rental itself anticipated? Is the single-family language structural or occupancy based? Is “commercial” an isolated word or part of a declaration that separately identifies hotels and businesses? Does state legislation constrain amendment authority? Was a minimum term actually recorded? The greatest limitations in a national survey follow from that same fact. Restrictive-covenant cases are unusually language dependent. Even a supreme court holding that “residential purposes” does not prohibit STRs does not establish that every declaration in that state permits them. _Tarr_ and _JBrice_ are powerful Texas authorities, but _JBrice_ repeatedly grounds its result in the actual Wilcrest Walk covenants. _Brandt_ proves the inverse proposition in Montana: _Craig Tracts_ did not immunize STRs from a later case involving materially stronger wording. A second limitation is precedential status. _McDougald_ and _Mileview_ are explicitly unpublished North Carolina opinions and do not constitute controlling authority under North Carolina's appellate rules. They are useful evidence about how _Armstrong_ is being applied, but they must not be presented as equivalent to a published supreme court decision. A third is the speed of statutory change. State legislatures continue to adjust municipal and association authority. The 2026 Idaho and Wisconsin appellate decisions themselves concern statutes specifically directed at rental regulation. Any practical application of this report should therefore recheck the current code as of the date of the dispute rather than relying solely on the legislation described here. For maintaining this survey as a living research product, the most efficient plan is:
Workstream Timing Estimated resources Output
Refresh appellate opinions and petitions for review Quarterly 8 to 12 researcher hours New published and unpublished STR covenant, HOA, zoning, and constitutional decisions
Legislative check for states in the private-covenant table Every legislative session, plus annual year-end sweep 12 to 20 hours Current matrix of statutes affecting HOA rental amendments, grandfathering, and municipal preemption
Shepardize or KeyCite retained authorities in a paid database Before publication or reliance in litigation 8 to 15 attorney/researcher hours Formal subsequent-history validation and negative-treatment check
Expand states presently represented only by zoning or amendment authority One focused research cycle 20 to 30 hours Higher-confidence national gap analysis
Document-level application for an actual owner Per property 2 to 6 attorney hours initially Comparison of recorded declaration, amendments, statutes, municipal code, and controlling state decisions
The most valuable next research investment is not another tally of states. It is systematic collection of the **operative covenant text** for each outcome and coding of that text against factors such as duration, “private” language, structural versus occupancy clauses, express leasing permission, hotel/motel examples, commercial prohibitions, amendment clauses, and association rulemaking powers. The present corpus strongly suggests those variables predict outcomes better than the bare fact that a court is “pro-STR” or “anti-STR.” ## Conclusion and table of authorities The best national answer to the original question is direct: **A deed restriction limiting property to “residential use,” standing alone, usually does not prohibit short-term rentals under the published American appellate decisions that have addressed the issue.** The majority line defines residential use primarily by what occupants do in the dwelling and refuses to infer a minimum stay that the covenant does not state. Texas, Tennessee, South Dakota, Mississippi, Washington, Maryland, Alabama, New Mexico and numerous intermediate courts provide strong authority for that proposition. But the qualifier “standing alone” carries most of the legal weight. A prohibition on trade or business, “private occupancy,” a one-family occupancy clause, explicit hotel comparisons, a declaration separating commercial and residential districts, or a clearly expressed neighborhood purpose can change the result. Kentucky, Michigan, Maine, Louisiana and recent Montana decisions demonstrate that alternative. When the document states a minimum rental term expressly, the residential-use debate largely disappears. The decisive questions become amendment authority, grandfathering, statutory consent requirements, and enforcement procedure. Tennessee may bind an existing owner to a properly authorized amendment; North Carolina subjects amendments to a reasonableness doctrine; Florida statutorily protects nonconsenting existing condominium owners; Idaho now demands affirmative written consent for a newly added rental restriction. No responsible national answer can flatten those rules into a single HOA principle. Finally, a zoning decision holding that transient lodging is not “single-family residential” does not decide a deed case. The Pennsylvania decisions make that distinction explicit, and constitutional attacks on municipal STR regulation operate under still another body of law. The authorities below consolidate the principal corpus. “Q1” means residential-use covenant, “Q2” business/commercial prohibition, “Q3” amendment or retroactivity, “Q4” association enforcement, “Q5” ordinance challenge, and “Q6” zoning classification.
Authority Court/status Question and operative language Holding, reasoning, subsequent significance
Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or. 358, 937 P.2d 1019 (1997) Oregon Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2, “residential purposes,” commercial enterprise Ambiguity concerning temporary occupancy resolved against restriction; foundational permissive authority cited by later courts.
O'Connor v. Resort Custom Builders, Inc., 459 Mich. 335, 591 N.W.2d 216 (1999) Michigan Supreme Court, published Q1, timeshare/“residential purposes” Permanent-presence conception of residence became the foundation for Michigan's later STR rule in Eager.
Woodside Village Condo. Ass'n v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 2002) Florida Supreme Court, published Q3 Broad amendment authority upheld under then-applicable law; later Florida legislation limits application of new rental restrictions to consenting or later-acquiring owners.
Pinehaven Planning Bd. v. Brooks, 138 Idaho 826, 70 P.3d 664 (2003) Idaho Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2 Renting residential property, short or long, did not violate a commercial-enterprise prohibition under the covenants examined; still followed in 2025.
Lowden v. Bosley, 395 Md. 58, 909 A.2d 261 (2006) Maryland Court of Appeals, published Q1 Transitory nature of occupancy does not eliminate residential character.
Mullin v. Silvercreek Condo. Owners Ass'n, 195 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) Missouri Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2 Nightly rentals not prohibited by the declaration's residential/business restrictions.
Scott v. Walker, 274 Va. 209, 645 S.E.2d 278 (2007) Virginia Supreme Court, published Q1 “Residential purposes” ambiguous as to transient presence, requiring construction favoring free use.
Silsby v. Belch, 2008 ME 104, 952 A.2d 218 Maine Supreme Judicial Court, published Q1/Q2 Residential rental and rental income do not automatically make property commercial; later distinguished rather than discarded by Morgan.
Mason Family Trust v. DeVaney, 2009-NMCA-048, 207 P.3d 1176 New Mexico Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2 Short-term dwelling use remained residential; more specific language required to prohibit it.
Applegate v. Colucci, 908 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) Indiana Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2 Explicit permission to rent for residential use plus no duration limit defeated an STR challenge; a separate on-site office issue was treated independently.
Russell v. Donaldson, 222 N.C. App. 702, 731 S.E.2d 535 (2012) North Carolina Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2 A commercial/business prohibition did not bar short-term residential vacation rentals.
Slaby v. Mountain River Estates Residential Ass'n, 100 So. 3d 569 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, published Q1/Q2 Short-term guests' ordinary living activities constituted residential use; rent did not transform use into commercial activity.
Estates at Desert Ridge Trails HOA v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) New Mexico Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2 Reaffirmed Mason and declined to impose permanence or a minimum length of stay.
Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Communities Ass'n, 180 Wn.2d 241, 327 P.3d 614 (2014) Washington Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2/Q3 Ordinary vacation occupancy remained residential; a majority amendment could not impose the new restriction beyond the original covenant plan.
Houston v. Wilson Mesa Ranch HOA, 360 P.3d 255 (Colo. App. 2015) Colorado Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2/Q3 Temporary occupancy still residential; the board could not add an unstated thirty-day limit through a rule.
Santa Monica Beach Property Owners Ass'n v. Acord, 219 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) Florida District Court of Appeal, published Q1/Q2, residential only; no business/manufacturing use Ordinary short-term living use remained residential; duration was not supplied by the covenant.
Eager v. Peasley, 322 Mich. App. 174, 911 N.W.2d 470 (2017) Michigan Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2, “private occupancy,” “private dwelling,” no commercial use STR violated private-use provisions; an alternate holding classified short-term rental as commercial.
Hensley v. Gadd, 560 S.W.3d 516 (Ky. 2018) Kentucky Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2 STR on residential lots prohibited where the declaration separately contemplated hotels and commercial use elsewhere; long-term residential rental remained permissible.
Forshee v. Neuschwander, 2018 WI 62, 914 N.W.2d 643 Wisconsin Supreme Court, published Q2, “no commercial activity” The restriction did not establish an enforceable STR ban; separate opinions reveal substantial disagreement over profit and on-premises “activity.”
Vera Lee Angel Revocable Trust v. O'Bryant, 2018 Ark. 38, 537 S.W.3d 254 Arkansas Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2 STR did not change the house's essential residential character under a covenant specifically identifying motel/hotel-type commercial uses.
Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n, 556 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. 2018) Texas Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2 Neither residential-purpose nor generic commercial-use restrictions supplied a minimum tenancy duration; the occupant's use controls absent more specific text.
Edwards v. Landry Chalet Rentals, LLC, 246 So. 3d 754 (La. Ct. App. 2018) Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal, published Q1/Q2 Transient occupancy held nonresidential and the owner's continuing rental operation commercial.
Orchard Estate Homes v. Orchard Homeowner Alliance (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) California Court of Appeal, certified for publication Q3 Judicial approval of a CC&R amendment process for an under-thirty-day prohibition affirmed under Civil Code § 4275 criteria.
Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, 940 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2019) Ninth Circuit, published Q5 Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to an owner-presence STR ordinance dismissed.
Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 207 A.3d 886 (Pa. 2019) Pennsylvania Supreme Court, published Q6 Purely transient lodging inconsistent with the ordinance's “family” and “single housekeeping unit” framework.
Kinzel v. Ebner, 157 N.E.3d 898 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q5/Q6 The deed did not clearly prohibit STRs; municipal zoning provisions governing non-transient dwellings presented a distinct inquiry.
Craig Tracts HOA v. Brown Drake, LLC, 2020 MT 305, 477 P.3d 283 Montana Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2 “Residential” ambiguous as applied to STRs; context and free-use principles supported the owner.
Wilson v. Maynard, 2021 S.D. 37, 961 N.W.2d 596 South Dakota Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2 Eating, sleeping and recreation made STR use residential; the dissent favored a broader view of the owner's commercial purpose.
Styller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lynnfield, 487 Mass. 588, 169 N.E.3d 160 (2021) Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, published Q6 Transient rental use did not fit the residential zoning scheme at issue; a zoning decision, not a covenant rule.
Lake Serene Property Owners Ass'n v. Esplin, 334 So. 3d 1139 (Miss. 2022) Mississippi Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2/Q3 STR as abode remained residential regardless of duration; a bylaw amendment could not override the recorded covenant scheme.
JBrice Holdings, LLC v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n (Tex. 2022) Texas Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2/Q3 Reaffirmed Tarr; the association also lacked statutory authority to contradict a covenant protecting leasing rights.
Nekrilov v. City of Jersey City, 45 F.4th 662 (3d Cir. 2022) Third Circuit, published Q5 Takings, Contract Clause, and due-process challenges to a tightened STR ordinance failed.
Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.4th 317 (5th Cir. 2022) Fifth Circuit, published Q5 A city-residency requirement facially discriminated against interstate property owners and violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
Morgan v. Townsend, 2023 ME 62 Maine Supreme Judicial Court, published Q1/Q2 Paying guests not categorically excluded by “private residential purposes”; an intensive recurring STR operation violated “no trade or business shall be conducted therefrom.” The dissent criticized an undefined tipping point.
Pandharipande v. FSD Corp. (Tenn. 2023) Tennessee Supreme Court, published Q1/Q3 The original “residential and no other purposes” clause did not bar STRs; a valid later thirty-day amendment did. Earlier Teffeteller reasoning rejected.
Town of Conway v. Kudrick (N.H. 2023) New Hampshire Supreme Court, published Q6 The ordinance's definition of a residential/dwelling unit permitted non-owner-occupied STRs; the dissent disagreed.
Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Owners Ass'n, No. 359664 (Mich. Ct. App. 2023) Michigan Court of Appeals, published Q1/Q2 Following Eager, short-term rentals were prohibited commercial use under an integrated residential/commercial plan.
Ruffed Grouse Ridge Owners' Ass'n v. Hura, No. 968 C.D. 2023 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024) Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, published appellate decision Q1/Q2 A private residential/commercial covenant did not prohibit ordinary STR occupancy; expressly distinguished Slice of Life zoning analysis.
McDougald v. White Oak Plantation HOA, No. COA23-756 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2024) North Carolina Court of Appeals, unpublished Q1/Q3 A ninety-day amendment was unreasonable under Armstrong where the original documents did not restrict rentals; noncontrolling.
Mileview LLC v. Reserve II at Sugar Mountain Condo. Owners Ass'n, No. COA23-603 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2024) North Carolina Court of Appeals, unpublished Q3 Amendment dispute applying North Carolina reasonableness principles; noncontrolling.
Myers v. Kleinhans, 2024 MT 208, 556 P.3d 529 Montana Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2 A commercial-business restriction reached STR operation; structural single-family wording analyzed separately.
Wihbey v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Conn. 2024) Connecticut Supreme Court, published Q6 Zoning classification resolved through ordinance-specific definitions of family, dwelling, roomers, and lodgers.
Vaughn v. Windfield Homeowners Ass'n, No. A24A1751 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2025) Georgia Court of Appeals, published appellate decision Q3 STR-barring amendments properly enacted and binding under the governing statutory/declaration framework.
Brandt v. R&R Mountain Escapes, LLC, 2025 MT 155 Montana Supreme Court, published Q1/Q2/Q4 The declaration as a whole, including a “country residential living” purpose and a broad commercial prohibition, barred STRs; fee denial affirmed.
Delano v. Pike, No. 52723 (Idaho Ct. App. 2025) Idaho Court of Appeals, published civil opinion Q2 A “no commercial enterprises” clause, expressly preserving private rentals, did not bar STRs; reaffirmed Pinehaven.
Lonshores Owners Ass'n v. Bennafield, No. E2024-00569-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2025) Tennessee Court of Appeals Q1/Q2 An ambiguous covenant could not be used to enjoin STRs, applying Tennessee's post-Pandharipande framework.
Salem v. Galbraith, No. E2024-00337-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2025) Tennessee Court of Appeals Q1/Q2 STR covenant claims produced mixed affirmance and reversal, reinforcing text-specific treatment after Pandharipande.
North Henry's Lake HOA v. Norton, No. 51990 (Idaho Jan. 6, 2026) Idaho Supreme Court, published Q3 I.C. § 55-3211 prevented an unconsented STR amendment from burdening the property or successors merely through record notice.
Northampton Maintenance Fund, Inc. v. JAS Luxury Rentals, LLC, No. 14-25-00512-CV (Tex. App. 2026) Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals Q3 Association-rule authority analyzed separately from Tarr's construction of a different covenant; confirms Texas results remain document specific.
Clinton v. Village of Sister Bay, No. 2025AP1825 (Wis. Ct. App. July 14, 2026) Wisconsin Court of Appeals Q5/Q6 Reversed and remanded a dispute over a village four-bedroom STR limitation under Wisconsin's statutory “Right to Rent” regime.
The authorities ultimately converge on one drafting principle even where they disagree doctrinally: **courts are much more willing to enforce a rental restriction that says what it means**. “Residential use” asks a court to characterize behavior. “No rental for fewer than thirty days” identifies the forbidden behavior directly. Most of the national split exists in the space between those two sentences. ## How we know This report is a national doctrinal survey of published American appellate authority on private residential-use covenants, association amendments, and — separately — municipal zoning and constitutional challenges, reviewed as of August 23, 2026. The retained corpus contains more than fifty appellate opinions, including older foundational cases that later high courts still cite. Trial-level decisions were excluded except where needed to explain appellate history. Law-firm summaries and association commentary were not treated as authority. Searches combined terms such as short-term rental, vacation rental, Airbnb, residential purposes, commercial use, private dwelling, restrictive covenant, deed restriction, HOA amendment, minimum lease, transient occupancy, and nonconforming use. Citation chaining from _Pandharipande_, _Morgan_, _Wilson_, and _Brandt_ supplied the competing lines. Recent statutes were checked against official legislative sources where accessible — Florida, Arizona, California, Idaho, Texas, and Wisconsin — and against the controlling appellate opinion where the opinion reproduced the statute. The private-covenant table is not a zoning map. A state missing from that table is not a state that permits short-term rentals. As-of dates on statutes are the effective dates in the official code or the date of the controlling opinion that applied them. Case-specific figures such as Townsend's 59 rentals in 28 months are taken from the opinion itself (Maine, 2023), not estimated. ## Sources - [Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n (Tex. 2018) — official opinion PDF](https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1441730/161005.pdf) - [JBrice Holdings, LLC v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n (Tex. 2022) — official opinion PDF](https://txcourts.gov/media/1454066/200857.pdf) - [Pandharipande v. FSD Corp. (Tenn. 2023) — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/tennessee/supreme-court/2023-m2020-01174-sc-r11-cv.pdf) - [Hensley v. Gadd (Ky. 2018) — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/kentucky/supreme-court/2018-2017-sc-000189-dg.pdf) - [Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Communities Ass'n (Wash. 2014) — official opinion PDF](https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/868701.pdf) - [Morgan v. Townsend, 2023 ME 62 — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/maine/supreme-court/2023-2023-me-62.pdf) - [Eager v. Peasley (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) — official opinion PDF]() - [Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Owners Ass'n (Mich. Ct. App. 2023) — official opinion PDF](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/49f1dd/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/opinions/final/coa/20230112_c359664_34_359664.opn.pdf) - [Brandt v. R&R Mountain Escapes, LLC, 2025 MT 155 — official opinion](https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=529609) - [North Henry's Lake HOA v. Norton (Idaho 2026)](https://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2026/51990.html) - [Styller v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynnfield (Mass. 2021) — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/massachusetts/supreme-court/2021-sjc-12901.pdf) - [Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, 940 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2019) — official opinion PDF](https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/10/03/17-55879.pdf) - [Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.4th 317 (5th Cir. 2022) — official opinion PDF](https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-30643-CV0.pdf) - [Clinton v. Village of Sister Bay (Wis. Ct. App. July 14, 2026) — official opinion PDF](https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=1145062) - [Idaho Code § 55-3211 — rental restrictions](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title55/t55ch32/sect55-3211/) - [California Civil Code § 4741 — rental restrictions in common-interest developments](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=4741.&lawCode=CIV) - [California Civil Code § 4275 — judicial reduction of amendment voting percentage](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=4275.&lawCode=CIV) - [Florida Statutes § 718.110 — condominium declaration amendments, including (13)](https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2025/0718.110) - [Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1806.01 — planned-community rental property](https://www.azleg.gov/ars/33/01806-01.htm) - [Texas Property Code Chapter 204 — powers of property owners' associations](https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/PR/htm/PR.204.htm) - [Wisconsin Statutes § 66.1014 — limits on residential dwelling rental prohibited](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/66/x/1014) ## How we know This report is a national doctrinal survey of published American appellate authority on private residential-use covenants, association amendments, and — separately — municipal zoning and constitutional challenges, reviewed as of August 23, 2026. The retained corpus contains more than fifty appellate opinions, including older foundational cases that later high courts still cite. Trial-level decisions were excluded except where needed to explain appellate history. Law-firm summaries and association commentary were not treated as authority. Searches combined terms such as short-term rental, vacation rental, Airbnb, residential purposes, commercial use, private dwelling, restrictive covenant, deed restriction, HOA amendment, minimum lease, transient occupancy, and nonconforming use. Citation chaining from _Pandharipande_, _Morgan_, _Wilson_, and _Brandt_ supplied the competing lines. Recent statutes were checked against official legislative sources where accessible — Florida, Arizona, California, Idaho, Texas, and Wisconsin — and against the controlling appellate opinion where the opinion reproduced the statute. The private-covenant table is not a zoning map. A state missing from that table is not a state that permits short-term rentals. As-of dates on statutes are the effective dates in the official code or the date of the controlling opinion that applied them. Case-specific figures such as Townsend's 59 rentals in 28 months are taken from the opinion itself (Maine, 2023), not estimated. ## Sources - [Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass'n (Tex. 2018) — official opinion PDF](https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1441730/161005.pdf) - [JBrice Holdings, LLC v. Wilcrest Walk Townhomes Ass'n (Tex. 2022) — official opinion PDF](https://txcourts.gov/media/1454066/200857.pdf) - [Pandharipande v. FSD Corp. (Tenn. 2023) — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/tennessee/supreme-court/2023-m2020-01174-sc-r11-cv.pdf) - [Hensley v. Gadd (Ky. 2018) — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/kentucky/supreme-court/2018-2017-sc-000189-dg.pdf) - [Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Communities Ass'n (Wash. 2014) — official opinion PDF](https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/868701.pdf) - [Morgan v. Townsend, 2023 ME 62 — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/maine/supreme-court/2023-2023-me-62.pdf) - [Aldrich v. Sugar Springs Property Owners Ass'n (Mich. Ct. App. 2023) — official opinion PDF](https://www.courts.michigan.gov/49f1dd/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/opinions/final/coa/20230112_c359664_34_359664.opn.pdf) - [Brandt v. R&R Mountain Escapes, LLC, 2025 MT 155 — official opinion](https://juddocumentservice.mt.gov/getDocByCTrackId?DocId=529609) - [North Henry's Lake HOA v. Norton (Idaho 2026)](https://law.justia.com/cases/idaho/supreme-court-civil/2026/51990.html) - [Styller v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Lynnfield (Mass. 2021) — opinion PDF](https://cases.justia.com/massachusetts/supreme-court/2021-sjc-12901.pdf) - [Rosenblatt v. City of Santa Monica, 940 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2019) — official opinion PDF](https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/10/03/17-55879.pdf) - [Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.4th 317 (5th Cir. 2022) — official opinion PDF](https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-30643-CV0.pdf) - [Clinton v. Village of Sister Bay (Wis. Ct. App. July 14, 2026) — official opinion PDF](https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=1145062) - [Idaho Code § 55-3211 — rental restrictions](https://legislature.idaho.gov/statutesrules/idstat/title55/t55ch32/sect55-3211/) - [California Civil Code § 4741 — rental restrictions in common-interest developments](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=4741.&lawCode=CIV) - [California Civil Code § 4275 — judicial reduction of amendment voting percentage](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?sectionNum=4275.&lawCode=CIV) - [Florida Statutes § 718.110 — condominium declaration amendments, including (13)](https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2025/0718.110) - [Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1806.01 — planned-community rental property](https://www.azleg.gov/ars/33/01806-01.htm) - [Texas Property Code Chapter 204 — powers of property owners' associations](https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/PR/htm/PR.204.htm) - [Wisconsin Statutes § 66.1014 — limits on residential dwelling rental prohibited](https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/66/x/1014)